The Long Strike of 1875 (and the rise of the Molly Maguires)

This was a labor strike by anthracite coal miners in northeast Pennsylvania which led to the dissolution of the first truly effective miners’ labor union (the Workingmen's Benevolent Association - WBA) that had been formed by mine workers in 1868. The strike was the result of Franklin B. Gowen’s (President of the Reading Company and the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company) effort to gain economic hegemony over parts of the southern and middle coalfields in Schuylkill, Columbia, and Northumberland Counties, Pennsylvania and creating a production and transportation monopoly for his firm(s). Gowen had over-invested in the railroad and mines and needed to cut his labor costs to remain viable. This strike has also become associated with the events between 1873 and 1877 that led to the Molly Maguire trials.  

Background

The Workingmen's Benevolent Association of St. Clair [See Pinkowski, Edward, John Siney: The Miner's Martyr, Sunshine Press- Philadelphia, (1963)] (WBA) was organized March 21, 1868. The WBA under John Siney of St. Clair, the chief organizer was granted a charter on June 11, 1868. Siney declined the presidency in favor of Ralph Platt. Siney had experience in organizing consumer cooperatives in England, and was in the forefront of the miners’ fight against company "company" stores. The men formed a "benevolent association" because they were advised by their lawyer, Linn Bartholomew, that state laws did not allow a charter for a trade union. This association was modeled upon the Miners' Benevolent Society of Carbon County, founded in 1864. The Workingmen's Benevolent Association was the name under which all parts of the anthracite fields were organized. In 1870 the legislature gave the society a new charter and the name was changed to the Miners and Laborers’ Benevolent Association, but it continued to be called, except officially, by its old name—the Workingmen's Benevolent Association [See Bulletin of the Department of Labor, Vol 13, November 1897, p. 733].

 

The WBA almost immediately proved to be a success, aided by the unfortunate Avondale Mining disaster. In the aftermath of the Avondale mine disaster, and as the other deaths and injuries continued, thousands of miners joined the WBA and participated in a series of job actions and strikes (often called turnouts). The WBA struck in April 1870 to combat a wage reduction. An agreement was reached in the latter part of July called, from the part taken in forming it by the president of the Reading Railroad, the “Gowen compromise,” ironically. Gowen and the Reading had not yet completed their move to take over mine operators in the southern and middle fields.  These moves were to take place between 1871 and 1875.

In 1871, a labor action in the northern field created a work stoppage. An appeal was made to the workmen in the other regions to support the labor action, but these workmen in the lower (southern) fields were reluctant to join in the strike. However, the WBA leadership believed a sacrifice was to be made, and resolved that they would adhere to the wage so long as Luzerne and Carbon (the two northern counties) worked with the WBA in good faith. Eventually this strike was resolved through the means of arbitration, the first use of this method in a labor dispute {see BULLETIN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, NO. 13—November, 1897, p.740]. Eventually, an agreement was reached for a minimum wage and a sliding scale which kept the miners and the operators at peace until 1875. This relative peace in labor relations was even maintained through the financial crisis, “Panic of 1873”, a depression in America and Europe. The WBA grew to represent over 30,000 miners in all regions of the coalfields [Danver, Steven L., Editor, Revolts, Protests, Demonstrations, and Rebellions in American History, Volume 1, ABC-CLIO (2011) p.466].

Prelude to the Long Strike

By 1872 the Reading Railroad was now through a sister company - the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company - also the biggest mine company in the lower anthracite region. It had used its monopoly on the railroads to take over a substantial acreage of coal lands. Between 1871 and 1875 Gowen borrowed $69 million to pay for his dual (coal and rail) empire. But he had overestimated the demand for train service (and the stable price of coal) and over-invested. Debt forced him and other railroads to fire many workers, resulting in a nationwide depression during the Panic of 1873.  By 1874 one third of Pennsylvania's work-force was unemployed.

In 1873 Siney left the WBA to pursue the presidency of a “national” miners’ union which embraced both anthracite miners in eastern Pennsylvania as well as bituminous coal miners in western Pennsylvania and Ohio - the Miners’ National Association (NMA).  Thomas F. Williams succeeded him at the WBA and later, John F. Welsh assumed leadership of the WBA [Kenny, Kevin, Making Sense of the Molly Maguires, Oxford University Press (1998) p. 169]. 

Gowen and the WBA co-existed in a fairly stable economic relationship between 1872 and 1874 [See Kenny Molly Maguires 1998, pp.168-170].  Gowen then sought to increase coal production in 1874 to stockpile reserves in anticipation of work stoppage under his consideration when he wanted to decrease  wages and improve his companies economic outlook.  Afterwards true to his plan, Gowen and the other operators (the Coal Exchange) then announced a harshly low wage rate for 1875 – 15-20% lower, and the abolishment of the agreed to minimum wage.  Surprisingly, the Miners' Journal, not a friend of organized labor, wrote [Miner’s Journal, January 4, 1875] that it had:

"...no hesitation in saying that these wages are too low for mining."

However, Gowen stated that these economic terms were non-negotiable in a ploy to get the WBA to strike, which it did on January 2, 1875 [The Pennsylvania Railroad Technical & Historical Society, CHRONOLOGY 1875, February 2006 Edition, p.2].

The Long Strike of 1875

The success of the strike would depend on regional solidarity.  For the strike to succeed, all the men in the upper and lower regions had to turnout (strike). In the Lehigh section of lower Luzerne County (the Eastern Middle Coal Field), the men quickly joined the striking mine workers of the two Schuylkill fields. But the workers in the Northern Coal Field, in upper Luzerne County, who had partially abandoned the WBA after their strike in 1871 and now belonged to the MNA,  did not agree to strike. Already agreeing to a pay cut of 10 percent, these men continued to work throughout 1875, dooming the prospects of a successful strike in the lower fields [Schlegel, Workingmen's Benevolent Association, p. 261.

As the strike continued month after month, many newspapers such as those in Harrisburg [Harrisburg Patriot, April 17, 1875] and Scranton [Scranton Republican, April 22, 1875] sided with the WBA, and unions from New York and Philadelphia contributed to the treasury of the WBA to help the miners in their strike against the mine operators [See Sunbury American, April 16, 1875.

Gowen responded by increasing the power of the Coal and Iron Police whose duty was to guard  those hired as strikebreakers. As the strike intensified, the police paraded through the streets of Schuylkill County seeking striker activity that turned violent. Strikers were reported to have derailed engines, set fire to loaded coal-cars, as well as burn down coal breakers and other buildings, and damage pumps (to flood mines). Against John Welsh’s orders, the miners played right into Gowen’s hands. By characterizing the labor union as a violent organization, rather than individual violent acts of frustrated workers, Gowen and Robert Ramsey (the new publisher of the Miners’ Journal (succeeding Benjamin Bannan in 1873) laid the groundwork for the eventual destruction of the WBA and any future unions for decades.  Welsh desperately offered to withdraw the basis system of wages and agree to any arrangement the operators were willing to make, but the Owners’ Coal Exchanges even refused to negotiate this favorable term.

By May, the Coal Exchange would no longer meet with the WBA at all [Schlegel,"The Workingmen's Benevolent Association," pp.264-66]. The operators now decided to reopen the mines unilaterally, guaranteeing protection to those who returned. In early June, the workers began to drift back to the mines and by July almost all of the collieries in the Schuylkill region were open again [Roy, History of the Coal Miners of the United States, 99]. 

A group of workers still refused to return to work. Most of the protest erupted between Shenandoah and Mahanoy City in Schuylkill County, and showed that violence was not a one way street. Striking workers paraded from Shenandoah west and attempted to convince the miners there who had returned to work, to again discontinue work, but the Coal and Iron Police led by Pinkerton (a detective form hired by Gowen) agent Robert Linden brought the march to a halt. The marchers changed course east to Mahanoy City, collecting followers as they went. Once they reached their destination, the crowd, which grew to thousands, only stopped when the police fired into the crowd. The miners returned to Shenandoah, defeated [See Schlegel, Ruler of the Reading, pp. 72-73; and Miners’ Journal, June 11, 1875].

On June 14, 1875, the WBA unconditionally surrendered by authorizing all locals in the anthracite fields to resume work on the best terms they could obtain individually.  Most men returned to work by July 1, ending the "Long Strike" and destroying the WBA union [The Pennsylvania Railroad Technical & Historical Society, CHRONOLOGY 1875, February 2006 Edition, p.27].

The WBA never recovered from the Long Strike; and within a few months it had collapsed. Workers were also forced to accept a wage 26.5 percent below the 1869 level. With the union gone, wages continued to fall over the next years until, in 1877, they were 54 percent below the 1869 level [Kenny, Making Sense of the Molly Maguires, p. 180 and see Chris Evans, History of the United Mine Workers of America from the Year 1860 to 1890, vol. 1 (Indianapolis: n.p., n.d.), p. 36].  Gowen and his allies had effectively evicted organized labor from the anthracite region

The Molly Maguires

Gowen had a fixation on this supposed secret organization dating back at least two years. Although never mentioned by name, in an article [Miners’ Journal, February 25, 1871], "The Tyranny in Schuylkill County," Benjamin Bannan described the “terrorism and tyranny” of the WBA and this "secret society".  To Bannan there was no difference between the secret society and the trade union; both were run by so-called terrorists. 

Gowen agreed with or himself initiated this assessment. When Pennsylvania’s Senate investigated railroad freight rates in 1871, Gowen had turned the proceedings into a general inquiry into labor-owner relations, conducted from his (and Bannan’s) point of view. Gowen insisted that a small, conspiratorial band of radicals (again un-named) controlled a majority of workingmen in the lower anthracite region.  He noted the existence of [Kenny, Making Sense of the Molly Maguires, pp. 143-44]:

"...an association which votes in secret, at night, that men's lives shall be taken, and that they shall be shot before their wives, murdered in cold blood, for daring to work against the order...the only men who are shot are the men to disobey the mandates of the Workingmen's Benevolent Association".

Neither Gowen nor Bannan had evidence to support these claims. Rumors circulated that the chimerical Molly Maguires were active once again (having first made the newspapers as anti-draft proponents in the early stages of the Civil War). Also in the early months of 1871, a number of mine superintendents in Schuylkill County were threatened and in October 1873, Gowen hired the Pinkerton Detective Agency to investigate to what extent this was true. This action introduced agent James McParland (McKenna) into Schuylkill County. He was not the only Pinkerton agent assigned. In 1874, P.M. Cummings joined the WBA in and attempt to confirm Gowen’s suspicions [Kenny, Making Sense of the Molly Maguires, pp. 156]. He could find no evidence, however, that the WBA was involved in violence [See Historical Society of Pennsylvania Collection, Pinkerton’sNational Detective Agency, report of Franklin to Gowen, on the work of Detective Cummings, March 27, 1874], despite rising to the level of official within the union [Lens, Sydney, The Labor Wars: From the Molly Maguires to the Sit-downs, Garden City, NY:Doubleday, (1973) p. 22].

It was the Long Strike and the associated violence during its latter half that allowed Gowen and Bannan’s successor at the Miners’ Journal, Ramsey, to identify the WBA with the “Molly Maguires” in 1875. Although the union leaders continued to condemn violence, they appeared to lose control over some of members of the rank and file as the strike dragged on for month after month. Evidence notwithstanding, Gowen and Ramsey conflated the miners’ labor movement and a closed secret society now being identified as the Molly Maguires [Kenny, Making Sense of the Molly Maguires, pp. 158].

A "coffin notice" was presented by Franklin B. Gowen, along with other similar coffin notices and a List of Outrages, as exhibits in his 1875 Legislative testimony. By Gowen’s account himself before the Pennsylvania State Legislature (in another investigation of the railroads) committee in July 1875 he identified a long list of “outrages” committed by miners/Molly Maguires, including 67 from the period after April 1, 1875. [De Wees, F.P., THE MOLLY MAGUIRES-THE ORIGIN, GROWTH, AND CHARACTER OF THE ORGANIZATION, J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO: PHILADELPHIA (l877), Appendix]. The defunct labor union (WBA) and the Molly Maguires now appeared (after Gowen’s and Ramsey’s efforts) to be as one and the same. And the Molly Maguires apparently became a new reality. Eventually the Molly Maguires were conflated with the Ancient Order of Hibernians (a secret Irish Benevolent Society) by Pinkerton's James McParlan's testimony in the future trials. McParlan claimed that the terms “Ancient Order of Hibernians”, “Molly Maguires” and “Buckshots” [another pejorative from the Civil War era] were interchangeable, describing the organization as “The Ancient Order of Hibernians, more commonly called the Molly Maguires,” [West, R. A., 1876. Report of the Case of the Commonwealth vs. John Kehoe Et Al., Members of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, Commonly Known as “Molly Maguires.” Indicted in the Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace, for Schuylkill County, Penna., for an Aggravated Assault. Pottsville, PA. Ed. Yale Law Library, s.a., p. 16] further stating the fantastical claim that “it was the general practice [of the AOH] to commit crimes.” [West 1876, p. 22]

 

The defeat of the WBA in the Long Strike on 1875 was however followed by three months of violence in the coal regions, which included six murders - Thomas Gwyther, Gomer Jones, Benjamin Yost, Thomas Sanger, William Uren and John P. Jones - now attributed to “Molly Maguires” (among others), by Pinkerton’s agent McParlan and his client, Franklin Gowen.  

As one self-identified “Molley” wrote [Shenandoah Herald, October 2, 1875 (sic)]: 

“… the union is Broke up and we Have got nothing to defind ourselves with But our Revolvers and if we dount use them we shal have to work for 50 cints a Day...i have told ye the Mind of the children of Mistress Molly Maguire, all we want is a fare Days wages for a fare Days work, and that’s what we cant get now By a Long shot." 

 

The "untold" story of the US Army in Thailand during the Vietnam War

Prologue

I am a Vietnam-era Vet. I served in the US Air Force and spent two TDYs (total of about 180 days) in SE Asia - one in Japan (Okinawa/Kadena) and one in Thailand (U-Tapao). The role of the Air Force in Thailand is well documented and known - F-4s, various RFs, B-52s, and KC-135s (my plane). What has been under-reported is the role of the other military branches, Army, Navy, Marines. This post tries to correct that oversight, at least as regards the Army.

What is known is that American military manpower in Thailand peaked in the late 1960s at about 47,000 personnel. From the build-up of US forces in the Vietnam theater of war (from 1964), the USAF personnel averaged 77% of that part of the force assigned to Thailand (over 3 of every 4 persons).

Figure 1: The American military presence in Southeast Asia peaked in 1968. “Vietnamization” of the war began the next year, with the first US troop withdrawals in July 1969. All told, some 3.4 million troops from all branches of the armed services spent time on duty in Southeast Asia. The “All Other” totals include Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.

From 1961 to 1975, the USAF deployed aircraft throughout Thailand, and these planes were responsible for the majority of reconnaissance and air strikes over North Vietnam. The first base of operations for American forces was at Thakli Royal Thai Air Force Base, which is located approximately 144 miles northwest of Bangkok, near Korat. USAF fighter-bombers first arrived in late 1961. The base predated the arrival of American ground forces in Vietnam. Other key bases for USAF operations within Thailand eventually included Korat, Ubon, U-Tapao, Don Mueang (Bangkok), Udorn and NKP (Nakorn Phanom).

The US Army in Thailand

A 1969 map titled U.S. Installations and Facilities in Thailand was prepared by the 652nd Topographic Engineer Battalion (published by USARPAC (United States Army Pacific) on November 1, 1969). It depicted the broad reach of all American forces in Thailand. The mapped data concerning American forces represents:

• US Army installations and facilities that numbered 45; 
• US Navy and Coast Guard installations that numbered 18; 
• US Air Force installations that numbered 28; and 
• “Joint and Others” that numbered 11. 

Figure 2: The 652nd Topographic Engineers, U.S. Installations and Facilities in Thailand, 1969. From Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division Titled Collection, Thailand – Military (Subj.) https://blogs.loc.gov/maps/files/2019/08/Thailand-1-web-2.jpg

The latter was composed of US government civilian personnel, such as ambassadorial staff, intelligence analysts, contractors, and others. Thus, US Army facilities represented over 44% of coverage in Thailand, but with much lower manpower as seen above in Figure 1. They were more specialized units such as RR (Radio Research Unit), RRSOU (Radio Research Special Operations Unit), Signal Intelligence Units, Communication Units, Integrated Wide-band Communications System (IWCS) Units, USOM (United States Operations Mission). US Army Engineer and Transportation units at Sattihip, the main seaport, and local in-country hubs, where they offloaded the bombs, rockets, ammunition (and all other supplies) and trucked it to nearby U-Tapao, and other USAF bases. The US Army also had facilities for R&R at Pattaya, and various billets, officers and NCO clubs in Thailand. Also, some US Army Special Forces units for training Thai Army volunteers who served in Vietnam existed.

Figure 3: List of US Army Facilities (45) from the Map in Figure 2

The US government viewed Thailand as a logical staging area for American forces because of its proximity to North and South Vietnam. Thailand also was buffered from the conflict zone by Laos and Cambodia, thereby making it safer for American personnel. With those factors in mind, the two governments reached a so-called "gentleman’s agreement" that permitted American forces to use Thai bases or construct new ones. 

The following is a list of US Army “camps” (and a summary of the function - if known) from the 1969 map (Figure 3):

• Camp Carrow - in Trang, 46th Special Forces Company assisted Thai forces in resisting Communist guerrilla activity in the south on the Malay Peninsula.
• Camp Charn Sinthope - located near Phanom Sarakham, southeast of Bangkok, serving as a staging ground for the 519th Transportation Battalion and related support operations
• Camp Friendship - Army base in Korat, Thailand, that served as a logistical hub, housing the Headquarters, United States Army Support, Thailand (USARSUPTHAI) and crucial for supporting US operations in the region,
• Camp Kanchanaburi
• Camp Khon Kaen - serving as a staging ground for the 519th Transportation Battalion and related support operations. There was also a "bare" (Marine) base near Nam Phong.
• Camp Lightning - near Sattahip (the main port of entry) for military supplies and transportation
• Camp Nam Phung - aka Camp 'Honky' or 'Hunky') in Phu Phan area near Sakon Nakhon, used by Special Forces

Figure 4: Nam Pung Lake south of Sakon Nakon US engineers constructed a base camp for Special Forces troops. The 70 man camp is shown in the foreground

• Camp Narai - Special Forces Company (Airborne) 1st. Special Forces
• Camp Nong Takdo - Pak Chang, Thailand, in Korat Province, a key training and operational base for US Special Forces, particularly the 46th Special Forces group
• Camp Pawai - sited in Lopburi, Thailand, used by 46th. Special Forces Company (Airborne) 1966--1971
• Camp Ramasun - at Udon Thani, a radio listening station staffed for over a decade by National Security Agency (NSA), United States Army, and United States Air Force (USAF) personnel

Figure 5: Camp Ramasun, near Udon Thani, 1973 by the 6924th Security Squadron,

• Camp Ruan Chit Chai - base for the 44th Engineering Group operations

Figure 6: Camp Ruam Chit Chai near Sakhon Nakhon, Thailand, the headquarters of the 44th Engr Gp 

• Camp Vayama - (for Sattahip Port) transportation

In addition to the above camps other camps were active later in the war (1970s) including:

• Camp Buri Ram
• Camp Essayons - located midway between Pak Chong and about 30 miles South of Korat South of Pak Thong Chai city. Primarily used in support of the construction of the Friendship Highway, a major roadway between Bangkok and Nong Khai on the Thai-Lao border near Vientiane, Laos.
• Camp Ku Su Mon - at Sattahip

Figure 7: Sattahip Deep Water Port in 1968. The project cost $40 million and became the second major port facility in Thailand handling 98 percent of all military cargo arriving in country, the Ko Mu Breakwater under construction.

• Camp Surin
• Camp Ratchaburi
• Camp Roi Et - assisted Thai forces in resisting Communist guerrilla activity near the Laos border
• Camp Samae San - in Sattahip
• Camp Srimahapoe

Summary of Some of the Army Missions in Thailand

The United States Army Support, Thailand was created in October 1966 and arrived at Camp Friendship, in Korat. The missions of USARSUPTHAI were: 

(1) Tactical: Provide the U. S. Army nucleus for a unilateral, bilateral or combined tactical headquarters to conduct ground combat operations in Thailand; 

(2) Training: Conduct continuing OJT (on-the-job training) of assigned Army units; 

(3) Planning: Conduct U. S. Army planning to support joint operational plans for current operations and contingency US unilateral, bilateral and SEATO plans; 

(4) Management: Exercise command management supervision of US Army construction programs, logistic operations, real property, facilities and project stocks; and 

(5) Logistical and Administrative: Provide 

(a) logistical support to US Air Force operations in North Vietnam and Laos and 

(b) US Army and joint service support as directed.

 Figure 8: Camp Friendship, 1963

On January 1, 1967 USARSUPTHAI officially assumed command and/or operational control of all US Army units in Thailand.  

Figure 9: The US Army Support Command Thailand patch, a shoulder sleeve insignia worn by soldiers who served with/under the US Army Support Command in Thailand

On 1 July 1974, USARSUPTHAI was inactivated at Camp Samae San, Sattahip.

Transportation

As early as 1961, the US Command in Control Pacific (CINCPAC) rotated US Air Force units out of the Philippine Islands to Royal Air Force bases in Thailand. They received logistical support from their home bases. However, as the war in Vietnam increased, the need to improve logistical infrastructure in Thailand became evident. With Bangkok as the primary commercial port in Thailand, different contingency plans identified the need for a second ground line of communication to northeastern Thailand (where the bulk of the US presence was envisioned). In 1962, the CINCPAC deployed troops and USAF units to Udorn Air Base in the Northeast, and in May, established the Military Assistance Command, Thailand to manage US forces in country.

As more US Air Force units deployed to air bases in Thailand, it placed an increasing demand on the limited port facilities in country for logistical support. So, on March 19, 1963, the US and Thailand governments signed the Specific Logistics Action, Thailand Agreement for the completion of a number of projects funded under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). In June 1966, MAP completed the first pier for the Royal Thai Navy at the Sattahip Naval Facility in the Gulf of Thailand located 76 nautical miles southeast of Bangkok. This pier could berth one vessel. The Army engineers also established a Delong Pier south of the facility in August 1966, which could berth two ships simultaneously. To complete the new line of communication, Thailand needed a all-weather road connecting it to the main highway. 

The completion of the new pier and Delong Pier came as the US Army’s involvement in the Vietnam War increased from an advisory role to the deployment of ground combat units during the summer of 1965. The second increment of troops began during the summer of 1966. That year the Port of Sattahip required a US Army transportation battalion to offload military cargo and conduct port clearance. Enter the 519th Transportation Battalion (Motor Transport), Which completed its deployment to Sattahip, Thailand on 17 December 1966. The 519th Transportation Battalion moved north to Camp Charn Sinthope near Phanom Sarakham, southeast of Bangkok. In Thailand it fell under the control of the recently activated US Army Support Command, Thailand located at Camp Friendship. In Thailand the 519th Transportation Battalion provided operational control of the following companies:

•     Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment
•     53rd Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo)
•     260th Transportation Company (Petroleum)
•     291st Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo)
•     313th Transportation Company (Reefer)
•     505th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo)
•     569th Transportation Company (Medium Truck Cargo)
•     33rd Transportation Platoon (Reefer)
•     254th Transportation Detachment (Trailer Transfer Point Operating)

In April 1966, construction began on a military pier. The project cost $40 million and was completed in 1968. The project provided berthing for four ships with 36-foot draft. This included cruiser-size vessels, roll-on/roll-off vessels, container vessels and auxiliary naval craft. The port dedication ceremony of the Sattahip Deep-Water Port Facility took place on May 30, 1968.

The line of communication originated at the Port of Sattahip and covered a network of 1,070 miles. The battalion established trailer transfer points (TTP) at three locations along the line of communication with the southernmost at Sattahip (Vayama and Samae San). Two-lane paved roads stretched from Sattahip to Camp Friendship at Royal Thai Air Force Bases in Korat and Takhli in the north. The battalion headquarters was stationed at Camp Friendship along with the 291st Medium Truck and 313th Reefer Companies and the 33rd Reefer Platoon, which also doubled as a trailer transfer point. The roads continued north to Camp Khon Kaen, Udorn, Sakorn Nakhon, NKP and Ubon. Udorn, NKP and Ubon were Royal Thai Air Force Bases. Camp Khon Kaen ran the northernmost trailer transfer point with a platoon from the 291st and then the 569th Medium Truck Company. 

Though-out its time in Thailand, the battalion headquarters were also located at Camp Friendship and then at Camp Samae San in Sattahip.

Special Operations

The 46th Company was deployed to assist the Thai military in resisting Communist guerrilla activity along the Laotian border, among the hill tribes in the north, and in the south on the Malay Peninsula. 

In October of 1966 the units deployed to Thailand where a Special Forces Operating Base was established at Camp Pawai, Lopburi, Thailand. On April 15, 1967 the unit was redesignated 46th Special Forces Company (Airborne), 1st Special Forces. In 1968 the company was headquartered southeast of Lopburi at Camp Pawai. In 1971 the company relocated to the Royal Thai Army Special Warfare Center at Fort Narai, Lopburi. 

The 46th Company conducted specialized Special Forces training at the Royal Thai Army (RTA) Special Warfare Center. Some members of 46th Company were based at NKP) and assisted Recon Teams from Command & Control North based in Danang, Vietnam from 5th SFG(A) who were running missions into Laos.

Many different Thai military and police units were trained by the 46th.Some of the units trained were the Thai Special Forces cadre and the Border Patrol Police. In addition, in the early 1970s the 46th trained units of the Cambodia military. The Thai Ranger School was founded by 46th Company.

Signal, Intelligence & Communication Operations

US Army Signal troops were providing a small US advisory group in Vietnam with communications that linked into the Army's worldwide network. By the time the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was established, high-frequency radio circuits operated in Vietnam were providing communications from Saigon to San Miguel in the Philippines, to Fort Bucknera large Army logistics base in Okinawa to Bang Pla near Bangkok in Thailand.  

In January 1962 the USAF awarded a contract to furnish and install BACK PORCH - a system capable of transmitting and receiving up to seventy-two voice channels simultaneously. The links of the system would extend from the Army's Saigon station at Phu Lam to Nha Trang; from Nha Trang to Qui Nhon; from Qui Nhon to DA Nang in the north; from Nha Trang to Pleiku in the Central Highlands; and west from Pleiku to a terminal in Ubon, Thailand. It was operated by the 39th Signal Battalion which deployed elements of the 362nd Signal Company to operate six terminals in Thailand. These six terminals were put into operation in January 1963 to furnish long-lines support to the joint US Military Advisory Group, Thailand; they were transferred to the 207th Signal Company in Thailand. Eventually there were 12 message and 3 voice channels operated in Thailand. 

Also operating in Thailand was the United States Army Security Agency (ASA) or the signal intelligence branch. The ASA was tasked with monitoring and interpreting military communications of the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and their allies and client states around the world (so this included North Vietnam, the Pathet Lao and Cambodian (and Thai insurgents). The ASA was directly subordinate to the National Security Agency and all major field stations had NSA technical representatives present. 

Although not officially serving under the ASA name, covertly designated as "Radio Research", ASA personnel of the 3rd Radio Research Unit were among the earliest US military personnel in Vietnam; the 3rd later grew to become the 509th Radio Research Group. In Thailand the units present were the 5th RRU (Radio Research Unit) which became the 83rd RRSOU (Radio Research Special Operations Unit) and then finally the 7th RRFS (Radio Research Field Station). Elements of them were located in Bangkok, Non Soong, Udorn (see Figure 5), Minburi, Ubon, Chiang Mai, Panom Sarakham and U-Tapao in their various incarnations. 

Engineering

The 44th Engineer Group had the mission of providing general engineer construction support to the 9th Logistical Command later USARSUPTHAI. Areas of responsibility covered Eastern Thailand from Sattahip in the south to Ubon in the east to Udorn in the north. The radius of operation extends up to 400 kilometers from the headquarters at Korat. The Group had a several battalions, 538th & 809th (and many companies under these) and some other support companies for work like pipelines (697th Co.) 

CAT and Air America

Although not a part of the US Army, Udorn was also a center of Asian CIA operations from 1955, starting as Civil Air Transport (CAT).  Air America's roles supportive of covert and overt situations related to hostilities in Asia and elsewhere. Operations were focused in Laos as part of the Secret War the US carried out against the Phatet Lao communist rebels operating in the country. Udorn also served as the location of "Headquarters 333", the Thai organization in charge of their forces in Laos.

Figure 10: The Udorn Air America compound, shown around 1965, crowded with T-28 Trojan aircraft likely destined for a CIA covert operation.

American Withdrawal from Thailand

The end of US military involvement in Thailand, specifically 1972–1975, was driven by the winding down of the Vietnam War and a request from a newly democratic Thai government for the removal of American combat forces. The phased withdrawal, which largely focused on the more numerous Air Force and Marine personnel, culminated in the exit of nearly all US forces by mid-1976. 

Winding down the Vietnam War: 

As the United States implemented its "Vietnamization" policy and disengaged from Vietnam, its need for extensive military bases in neighboring Thailand diminished. By January 1973, US combat air operations in Southeast Asia had officially ceased.

In October 1973, a popular uprising in Thailand ended the long-standing military dictatorship. The new, democratically elected government was more nationalist and less tolerant of a large US military presence within its borders. The Thai government faced increasing domestic dissent and political pressure to remove US forces. Riots in Bangkok targeting the US Embassy in 1975 further fueled calls for withdrawal

The fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia to communist forces in April 1975 intensified regional instability and strained US-Thai relations. The Thai government was particularly angered by the US use of its bases for the Mayaguez rescue operation in 1975 without permission. 

Timeline of withdrawal (1972–1976)

1972–1973: Initial phase-down: In the first half of 1972, US Army presence in Thailand was limited to support roles for Air Force and clandestine operations in Laos. By this time, combat troops from Thailand had already left South Vietnam.

After the Paris Peace Accords were signed in January 1973, US combat forces began to depart in larger numbers. For example, a major Marine contingent based at Nam Phong departed in September 1973. 

1974: Escalated draw-down: Negotiations between the US and Thailand led to an acceleration of the withdrawal schedule. By the end of 1974, the US closed several airbases, including Takhli and Ubon. 

1975: Withdrawal of combat forces: In March 1975, the Thai government formally announced its policy of seeking better relations with its neighbors and requested that all US combat troops be withdrawn within a year. By the end of 1975, US combat forces had been withdrawn from Thailand, under Palace Lightning.

1976: Complete military withdrawal: The US and Thailand failed to reach an agreement for a residual, non-combat force to remain in Thailand. The Thai government formally ordered the complete withdrawal of all remaining US military personnel, with the exception of a few military aid advisers.

All US military facilities, including the key airbases at U-Tapao, Korat and Udorn, were (completely) turned over to the Thai government. The withdrawal of US forces was essentially complete by July 1976. 

Legacy of the withdrawal

The end of US Army and US Air Force involvement in Thailand significantly reduced the American footprint in Southeast Asia. The withdrawal actually helped modernize Thailand's armed forces, which received a large quantity of American-left military equipment and infrastructure. Thailand also emerged as a stable economic and political power in the region, avoiding the fate of its then communist-controlled neighbors Cambodia and Laos. 

 

 

Part 6 - One Son's Father, The White War, Trentino, 1916-1918

Prologue

From November 4 to 10, 1916, the infantry of the Macerata Brigade were transferred from the Doberdò area—where they had participated in the Ninth Battle of the Isonzo—to Ala and Pilcante in Vallagarina, near Lake Garda. On November 11, the Brigade entered the front line, under the command of the 37th Division, in the Monte Baldo sector (Mount Baldo - Mount Giovo - Besagno - Castello di Tierno (Mori) - Malga Val Gatto - Cima Mezzana - Passo Buole - Malga Zugna). 

Map showing where the 121st Regiment served in 1916-1918, in Trentino, part of the White War

As Brian Mockenhaupt wrote in Smithsonian Magazine:

“In subzero temperatures men dug miles of tunnels and caverns through glacial ice, They strung cableways up mountainsides and stitched rock faces with rope ladders to move soldiers onto the high peaks, then hauled up an arsenal of industrial warfare: heavy artillery and mortars, machine guns, poison gas and flamethrowers. And they used the terrain itself as a weapon, rolling boulders to crush attackers and sawing through snow cornices with ropes to trigger avalanches. Storms, rock-slides and natural avalanches — the ‘white death’ — killed plenty more. After heavy snowfalls in December of 1916, avalanches buried 10,000 Italian and Austrian troops over just two days.”

Although the 121st Infantry was not part of this "welcome" to the White War, the sister 122nd Regiment was part of this "avalanch-acre". Despite all the hardships of a war in the alpine 

Location of the Brigata Macerata  Avalanche in Val di Gatto - White Friday (December 13, 1916) occurred at the Italian Front of during World War I, when an avalanche struck an Austrian barracks on Mount Marmolada, killing 270 soldiers at Gran Poz. During the following weeks several other avalanches throughout the Italian front (including these) were lumped together. It is estimated that 9,000 to 10,000 soldiers perished.  Though the major occurrence at Gran Poz took place on a Wednesday in 1916, the term White Friday was applied.

heights and glaciers, this theater of war had a distinct advantage over the Isonzo for the everyday soldier.  This advantage was that there was no war of attrition here. There were localized (often intense) firefights, small battles and occasionally a large battle (usually instigated by the Austrians so not on the scale of the Battles in the Isonzo) to try to break out of the trenches and accomplish a pincer move to the main battlegrounds to the east. To the Italian command this was not an offensive war zone. Although there were originally plans existent to move up the Val Lagarina and into Trentino, the main goal was to keep the Austrians from breaking through and trapping the Italian main force at the easternmost Isonzo front, similar to what nearly happened during the Strafexpedition in May 1916. 

Here as in the Isonzo area the Austrians had abandoned the political borders in order to retreat to high ground which was easy to defend. But here the Italian objective was the same - DEFEND and protect the rear of the Isonzo troops.

The White War pushed soldiers to a different limit. Troops were forced to dig trenches and shelters in the rock and ice of the mountains, climbing carrying munitions and artillery pieces, fight between rocks and in Trento, the deep snow (no glaciers), often with inadequate equipment. At altitudes of over 2-3,000 meters, with temperatures freezing even in summer and which could reach 30 degrees below zero in winter, the most insidious enemies were exposure and avalanches, which led to incessant extra work in freezing trenches and claimed victims among the patrols keeping watch in the mountains. In later years my father commented that, “It was the coldest I’ve ever been in my life.”

In these sectors there were occasional battles, even half-hearted assaults, though otherwise troops which were assigned to protect the fortifications in this region lived out the war in relative safety. The actual fierce front action in this White War took place farther north towards the glacier regions of the Presena and the Adamello massif with its peak at 3,554 meters elevation.

Actions in 1916

The initial encampments of the Macerata Brigade were at Val di Gatto, Cima Mezzana, Passo Buole and Malga Zugna. In 1916 there were no specific large battles or enemy actions encountered by the Brigade.  The Brigade history noted: “They (the troops) alternated between the front and rear and performed constant patrols with occasional firefights with the enemy. They performed extensive defensive fortification building marred by many avalanches in the winter causing many losses.”

Passo Boule, Mt. Zugna

The Brigade had to undergo mountain training “on the go”. The Alpine landscape was challenging: mountains up to 2,000m above sea level, with some slopes of up to 80°. There were minimal road and rail connections to the area and in order to make the landscape more suitable for warfare, intensive road-building programs took place; both opposing armies also had to build bridges across mountain ravines, and to construct forts, barracks and huts to serve as accommodation, as well as digging trenches (where possible) or using explosives to create networks of underground caves and tunnels for protection, accommodation and storage. The Italians used cable cars and mules to transport food and munitions up to the mountain-top front lines – and to take the wounded back down to the plains, where hospitals were situated.

Paths at Cima Mazzana

Temperatures remained below freezing for at least four months of each year and snow was a constant presence in winter, with improvised snow trenches being used for defense. Both armies equipped soldiers with ice picks, ropes, snow suits, cold weather clothing and goggles.  Cold and frostbite were real problems for all men in the high Alps, especially when it came to treating the wounded. 

Actions in 1917

The Brigade moved its troops in 1917 to the western Brentonico sub sector. The entire year of 1917 was spent in Vallagarina, in the this sector (Crosano - Ala - Castello di Tierno (Mori)- Besagno - Cazzano - Castuine - Mount Giovo), where the Brigade rotated its units between front-line shifts and rest periods, as well as between patrol activities and front-line construction work.

The front line in these sectors remained more or less static until the end of the war in October 1918, with two armies perched on this strip of land separated by between 700 and 900 meters of no man’s land.

Italian Command Bulletins (Settore Val D’Adige), although not specific to the Macerata brigade, give an idea of what life in this theater was like when the shooting started:

• January 5 - In the area between Adige and Garda on the night of the 4th, an enemy unit violently attacked our advanced lines, greeted by intense firing and machine-gun fire folded up into disorder with considerable losses.
• 21 January -1 February - Between Sarca and Adige enemy movements and artillery duels.
• February 11 - On the front, thirty scattered actions of the artillery; ours targeted the enemy positions of Monte Creino (north of the Loppio depression).
• March 20 - On the slopes of Dosso Casina (south of the Loppio depression) one of our squads occupied an advanced enemy position, taking possession of ammunition and materials.

Italian soldiers at Dosso Casina

• April 4 - On the Trentino front, occasional actions of the artillery, more active also yesterday in the Adige valley where, in retaliation for persistent enemy shots on Ala, we renewed the bombing of the military works of Riva, Arco and Rovereto.
• April 8 - Usual artillery actions. Ours carry out shots on military systems near Mori (Valle Lagarina).
• April 11 - To the renewed enemy medium-sized shots on the inhabited areas of Limone (Garda) and Ala, our batteries responded with retaliatory shots on the enemy lines near Arco and Rovereto.
• April 29 - From Garda to the Brenta on the day of the 28th persistent activity of the enemy aircraft that launched a few bombs on Ala (Lagarina Valley) ...
• May 10 - in the area of ​​Valle d'Adige the night on the 9th the enemy, after preparation of the artillery, launched small attacks on the slopes of ... Dosso Casina and against Sano (south-west of Mori). He was retorted before he reached our lines. Small nuclei that entered our place near Sano were immediately driven back by a counterattack.

Italian Front Lines at Tierno Mori and Talpina with Lake Loppio in background

• May 22 - Between Garda and Adige, after intense and prolonged artillery action of all caliber, the enemy attacked the position of Dosso Alto (south-west of Lake Loppio). The assailants were thrown back with serious losses.
• July 24 - Yesterday the enemy brought more activity on the Tridentine front: his units harassed our workers near Tierno (Mori).
• 25 July - On the Tridentine front, enemy attempts to surprise our advanced places near Lake Loppio were promptly repressed.
• July 27 - In Malga Zures (east of Garda) ... our patrols provoked small actions with a favorable outcome for us.
• July 30 - Yesterday the fighting activity on several points of the Tridentine front: small actions with a favorable outcome took place ... in the depression of Loppio (east of Garda).
• August 11 - South-east of Mori in Val Lagarina, in the night on the 10 strong enemy nuclei, having overcome the resistance of a new advanced place, they managed to penetrate it, but they had to immediately clear it in front of our prompt hurries.
• October 15 - Attempts by enemy nuclei against Dosso Alto (Val Lagarina) remained unsuccessful.
• October 17 - South of Mori, our small guard units, attacked by enemy patrols, repelled them and took some prisoners.

Brentonico after artillery attack 

A 121st Regiment (3rd Battalion Engineers) structure marker on the road between Brentonico and Castione

During the year, there were several artillery and small battles that affected the plain of Mori and the locality of Sano, Lake Loppio, Dos Casina and Dosso Alto di Nago. 

Although the lines of this front remained substantially unchanged, with the Italian defeat of Caporetto on October 24, the advanced positions in the area of Mori and Lake Loppio retreated, and fell back onto the slopes of Monte Baldo Nord, in the Castione area. The stations there are strengthened to resist any follow-up breakthrough attempts.

Castione in 1918

Actions in 1918

In January 1918, the Macerata infantry were still in the Brentonico sector but now further west (Brentonico - Castione - 912th Hill - Dosso Alto di Castione - Mt. Altissimo Sector - Mt. Giovo - Coste di Tierno - Crosano - S. Cecilia - Cazzano - Talpina) and were then rested between Avio and Sabbionara until March 1st, being replaced by the Foggia Brigade (280th, 281st, and 282nd Infantry Regiments).

From March 2 to April 30, the Brigade shifted operations in the Monte Altissimo sector (Mt. Altissimo - Doss Casina - Doss Romit [804th Hill] - Cazzano - Cornè - Resistance Line - 630th Hill - Doss Spirano - 1125th Hill - Roccioni - Malga Rigotti - Malga Sorgente).

Again, from the Italian Command Bulletins (Settore Val D’Adige): 

• January 4 - In the mountain area yesterday there were many concentrations of fire in the Lagarina Valley ... and greater activity of the enemy batteries against our positions at the Altissimo (east of Garda).

Barracks at Mt. Altissimo

• January 13 - Our patrols were very active in the Loppio depression ...
• January 22 - In the Zures regions ... the artillery explained persistent and lively actions.

View of Malga Zures today

• February 4 -... our scouting corps carried out coups in Castione (su di Mori) ... capturing prisoners.
• February 14 - Between "Garda" and "Adige", our "Arditi", overcame several orders of barbed wire enemies, they unexpectedly reached the opposing line in two points, killing several lookouts and drawing some prisoners.
• March 5 - In the Loppio region (Val Lagarina) there was a lively exchange of cannon shots and our patrols with successful harassment actions raised lively alarm in the enemy line.
• March 6 - South of Tierno enemy patrols, which tried to reach our lines, were repelled with losses.
• March 19 - To the east of Garda our advanced places dispelled opposing patrols that tried to surprise them.
• April 21 - To the west of Mori our assault corps attacked the small enemy guards in the region of Sano and, after lively struggle, managed to destroy two and to repel a third; some prisoners brought back.

Then between May and June the Brigade left the Vallagarina and were engaged in a period of exercises and training in Valeggio sul Mincio, in the Verona area, The training was all in anticipation of the Battle of the Solstice they were now transferred to the Piave River front in the Treviso area.

Pilcante on the Adige River, Rest and recuperation behind the front lines in The Monte Baldo Sector ca. 1904

Part 5 - One Son's Father: The Battles of the Isonzo River, 7th, 8th and 9th, The Trieste Offensive, September - November 1916

Prologue

After Gorizia, Cadorna turned his attention to the remainder of the Karst Plateau. Three successive (and short) offensives between September and November were begun and then brought to a halt by a combination of heavy enemy gunfire and bad weather. Together they would cost the Italians 125,000 dead and wounded, as opposed to 85.000 Austrians.

The Austrian command correctly believed that Cadorna would strike on the Karst Plateau again intent on trying to reach Trieste.  The Italian Navy had a plan to use an amphibious assault using a division sized force in concert with a land attack on Trieste. The landing of a division-sized force behind Austrian lines would have turned Boroevic's (the Austrian commander) vulnerable left flank; combined with a general offensive, such a joint army-navy operation might easily have enjoyed strategic success, including the capture of Trieste from the rear. Cadorna had enough troops to spare, but he was uninterested in any plan that was not his own and was not focused on the Isonzo front. 

Meanwhile, Boroevic after the defeat at Gorizia, was strengthening the second defensive positions. By early September, the 5th Imperial Army had 40,000 construction troops, half of them unarmed Russian prisoners of war, working day and night in the Isonzo valley. They built stone reinforcements, dug deeper trenches, laid foot-high walls of sandbags, placed steel shields and barbed wire in front of entrenchments, and did all the tasks that were required to make the army's positions ready for Cadorna's next attack. They worked especially hard on the Carso, where the next Italian blow was expected. The construction units suffered regular losses to random Italian artillery fire, but remarkably, most of the second defensive line was ready in the second week of September, fortuitously, because Cadorna would launch another direct ground offensive to Nova Vas on September 14 in the Seventh Battle of the Isonzo, also known as the Battle of Nad Logem. Nad Logem refers to a strategic summit on the Karst Plateau, located along the Isonzo Front, near Doberdò. 

Moreover, the loss of Gorizia convinced the Austrian AND GERMAN High Commands of the gravity of the Italian threat, and Boroevic received more new units and replacement battalions than ever before (even drawing troops from the Eastern Front with Germany's consent). By mid-September, the Austrian forces on the Isonzo reached an unprecedented strength of almost fourteen divisions (165 infantry battalions). Boroevic also received artillery reinforcements from the High Command also by mid-September. 

Moreover, the battle-worn divisions broken by the Sixth Battle were being rapidly rebuilt. Only a month after its loss, Austria's 58th Division was again at full strength, but its character had changed; only one-third of the division's eighteen infantry battalions were Dalmatian (locals), the rest being new units drawn from all over the empire. The 17th Division was also reconstructed to look much like its former self. The Austrian VII Corps still held the line on the north and central Carso; the plateau's southern third was garrisoned by a mostly Czech battle group, one and a half divisions strong. In all, Austria had seven brigades-32,000 infantrymen-at Isonzo to beat back the expected coming Italian offensive. The Italians knew little of this rapid recovery.

Battle of Nad Logem

On September 13 the Macerata Brigade had again been deployed to Doberdo as part of the 31st Division – south of Quota 208 Sud and on September 15 is ready for action in the narrow, deep but small valley of Bonetti, south of Quota 208 Sud.

The Macerata Brigade was positioned left of the lake opposite Quota 208 S (see C), attacking into the valley to the right.

After ceasing artillery fire, the II Battalion of the 121st Regiment initiates a bayonet attack to the edge of the Austrian trenches but the lateral troops cannot support the advance and the Battalion is forced to fall back.  They are then reinforced by I Battalion of the 122nd Regiment who make a breakthrough and leap over a sinkhole (dolina) leading to the capture of 20 Austrian officers and 200 troops. The enemy counterattacked and forced the left of the line to fall back.  The 31st Division faired considerably better than its neighboring 19th Division.  This group was torn apart by machine gun and artillery fire well before reaching the Austrian lines.  Then a surprise counterattack by a single company of Austria’s 11th Kaiserjägers pushed the dazed Italian troops back to their own lines.  Also an attempt by the XII Corps to expand its hold on Quota 144 also failed.

Trenches at Quota 208 Sud (South)

From September 17 until 24 the action ebbed and flowed in another bloody battle. The Macerata Brigade is then relieved by the Modena Brigade and moves to Romans d’Isonzo in the rear to recuperate. 

The short nature of this battle allowed the Austrians to continue to rebuild. By this time the Imperial Army was now facing three fronts – the Eastern (Russia), the new Transylvanian (Romanian) and the Italian. The Italian front was still the lowest priority but the high command was able to send two more divisions to Borovic and more work was done in the south sector on the secondary defensive lines towards Trieste.

Map showing the locations of the places involved in the Battles of the Isonzo River (7, 8 & 9)

The Eighth Battle of the Isonzo River

On October 10, the Eighth Battle of Isonzo ensued. Essentially this was a continuation of Italy’s prior attack in September (Nad Logen) which in turn was an attempt to extend the bridgehead established at Gorizia in August 1916 south to Trieste. Cadorna was determined to continue Italian attacks to the left of the town of Iamiano (Jamiano), a policy that continued during the subsequent (ninth) battle - with equal lack of success.

33rd Division Position at Quota 208 Sud

On October 12 the Macerata Brigade is sent again to the front lines under the command of the 33rd Division. Two battalions are sent to Quota 208 and two battalions are sent to the towns of Palichisce and Ferletti under the command of the 47th Division and first to Vermegliano (in reserve) and thence to Boneti to replace the 41st Regiment. 

The Battle could be considered an Italian victory because some ground was gained (but not enough to indicate a path to Trieste). However, what the Battle also showed was that the still beleaguered Austrians had just enough strength to stop an advance but not be overrun.  This was the war of attrition that Italy would be expected to win if no further changes were made.  As long as there were enough infantrymen to sacrifice - “offer up in grey-green clothes” – as articulated by D’Annunzio, the odds would be in Italy’s favor.

It is worth noting, however, that this battle represented at least in theory one of the most dramatic moments for the Empire of Austria-Hungary. Although Cadorna and his military commanders were unaware, the resistance at Iamiano (the small village to the south-east of Doberdò) saved the destiny of that front for Borevic. In fact the Austro-Hungarian commanders, after the withdrawal that had taken place in August, were still re-organizing the new defensive lines in the south. A specialist sent by Vienna to visit the Vipacco Valley suggested the organization of a new fortified line that would be placed further back from the first line (by about three kilometers) and that would take advantage of the maze of rocky paths and of the numerous natural caverns around Mount Ermada.  When the combatants reached Iamiano in this battle, the new defensive lines were still inadequate and if the Italian army had continued along this road, it would most likely have succeeded in breaking through and in advancing towards Trieste. 

But the reality was otherwise. As with the earlier, Seventh Battle attack, heavy Italian casualties - this time 50,000–60,000 killed, wounded, missing or captured, compared to 38,000 killed, wounded, missing or captured for the Austrians - required that the short, sharp concentrated initiative be called off pending the army's recuperation. The Trieste-Isonzo onslaught was next renewed with the Ninth Battle of the Isonzo on 1 November 1916.

The Ninth Battle of the Isonzo River

The German command still recognized the gravity of the situation and allowed another single Austrian division to be transferred from the Russian front to Italy.  They would arrive in late October. 

Sketch showing components of the Italian Third Army before the 9th Battle of the Isonzo River, including the Macerata Brigade SE of Boneti

The battle began on November 1, after 24 hours of artillery fire. The Italian XI Corps made a breakthrough of the front in its sector, occupying important positions on Veliki Hribach and Pecinka; on the contrary the XIII Corps was stopped by the counterattack of the Imperial Army. During the night the Austrian counter produced a constant artillery fire on the new positions of Veliki and Pecinka, held by the 45th division; at 4 o'clock they attacked en masse but the resistance of the Barletta brigade saved the day. This part of the battle which lasted more than 12 hours, allowed the arrival of the reserves, practically saving the situation of the 45th division. On November 2 new positions were taken on the Karst plateau in the area of ​​Castagnevizza, while towards the south the Imperial Army resisted the Italian assault. Because of the shortage of ammunition and considering the new positions taken as satisfactory Cadorna ordered the suspension of operations on the evening of the November 2. Then on November 3 and 4 the struggle suddenly resumed, due to the retreat of the Austrians to more backward positions, a retreat immediately exploited by Italian troops that on the evening of the November 4 who occupied all the trenches of Mount Fajtji. But as always, the Austro-Hungarian Army's position on the high terrain provided a formidable natural barrier to the Italians' attempts to achieve the breakthrough to Trieste.

Bombardment during battle near Boneti

Also on November 1, the Marcerata Brigade took its part in the Ninth Battle of the Isonzo River as part of the 33^rd Division - again at the northern flank of the main thrust of the assault. In the initial wave they were able to overrun the enemy trench and at Quota 208, capture 200 Austrians and send many on the run back to their rear. But the flanks were unable to duplicate this success and with the threat of being cut off the advanced units returned to their initial positions. Three other battalions (the I and II of the 122 Regiment and V of the Bersaglieri) launched another attack. The loss of the three battalion commanders (two fallen on the field and the other seriously injured) stymied the effort and as a result the gains were outweighed by the losses on the battlefield. The Brigade (tired and exhausted) eventually took the ridge of the Valtellina after having lost on 17 officers and 546 men. These unit actions were recognized by the award of the Medaglia d'argento al valore militare.

Italian soldiers in trench at Quota 208 Sud

Aftermath for the 121st infantry

The Karst Plateau Campaign was over for the winter of 1916-1917.  The Macerata Brigade was now miraculously to be transferred to the “quiet” Trentino Front - the White War. On November 4 the Brigade is sent to Vermigliano, then the next days to Cervignano and Strassoldo and on November 6-8 moved by rail to Val Lagarina between Pilcante and Brentonico-Passo Buole under the control of the 37th Division tasked with the protection and defense of Baldo sector and Brentonico sub-sector where they spent the rest of the year, the entirety of 1917 and a part of 1918.